ABSTRACT
INTRODUCTION
A recent survey of global CEOs found that enterprise risk management (ERM) is a priority among more than one-third of CEOs (39 percent strongly agree) and their boards (38 percent strongly agree) (PwC 2008) . Analysis of more than 1000 directors serving on the boards of top 2000 publicly traded companies through 2009 Annual Corporate Directory survey revealed that, about 60 percent of the board members considered "Unknown risks" as their daunting task, and about 56 percent emphasized that the board of directors (BOD) must invest much more time and focus on risk management than in the past (PwC 2010) . Creatively mitigating risk is critical to maximizing shareholder value and corporate governance (CG) requires firms to address various risk issues integratedly and simultaneously through enterprise risk management (ERM) 1 processes (Yilmaz & Flouris, 2010) . There is a need to shift thinking from CG as a cost or risk mitigation effort, to CG as a strategic goal that brings in new revenues (Pohle & Hittner, 2008) .
Corporate executives are "justifiably uncomfortable making a deeper commitment to ERM initiatives without a clear and quantifiable business case" (Sim Segal (2011) ). Rightly so, Niamh and Solomon (2008) in their overview of corporate governance, accountability and mechanisms of accountability, placed risk management (as one of the mechanisms of accountability) and undertaking studies in developing economies (as a part of globalization) on the frontiers of CG research.
Academics and industry commentators argue that ERM and CG benefit firms by decreasing earnings and stock price volatility, reducing external capital costs, increasing risk awareness, increasing capital efficiency, and creating synergies between different risk management activities (Miccolis and Shah, 2000; Gumming and Page | 36 A second potential source of value of CG from ERM initiative arises due to improved information about the firm's risk profile. Outsiders are more likely to have difficulty in assessing the financial strength and risk profile of opaque firms that are highly complex both financially and operationally. ERM enable these opaque firms to better inform outsiders of their risk profile and serve as a signal of their commitment to risk management. By improving risk management disclosure, ERM is likely to reduce the expected costs of regulatory scrutiny and external capital (Meulbroek, 2002) . Additionally, for banks, insurers and large business houses, the major rating agencies have put increasing focus on risk management and ERM specifically as part of their financial review. This is likely to provide additional incentives for these firms to consider ERM programs, and also suggest a potential value implication to the existence of ERM programs in these firms. For instance, in October 2005, Standard & Poor's announced that with the emergence of ERM, risk management will become a separate, major category of its analysis. In February 2006, A.M. Best released a special report describing its increased focus on ERM in the rating process. Smithson and Simkins (2005) provide a thorough review of the literature regarding the value relevance of risk management. Although these studies considered specific types of hedging activity, very few studies find evidence of relationship between CG, ERM and value of the firm (Allayannis and Weston, 2001; Guay and Kothari, 2003) , which is the purpose of this research paper.
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
From the perspective of CG, the key elements of successful ERM programs are (a) comprehensive and transcendent risk management that operates to avoid silos, and (b) senior level (preferably board level) involvement in risk management. It is the responsibility of the BOD and the senior management to define the firm's risk tolerance and to ensure that the firm's risk management framework includes detailed policies that set specific firms' activities that is consistent with its risk tolerance and capacity. In order to determine the overall risk tolerance, the BOD and senior management must have an understanding of risk exposures at three levels: at the level of system, at the level of the firm/enterprise, and at the transaction level. These aspects are conceptualized in the framework in figure. 1. It is reasonable to posit that at the system level, the firm's BOD strategically formulates both (A) CG initiatives and (B) ERM initiatives as elements of CG. At the firm level, the top-management strategizes these initiatives through creating specific instruments such as Audit Committees, Risk committees, and induction of independent board members for ensuring effective CG. At the transaction level, the firm's operatives implement ERM initiatives to mitigate operation risk, liquidity risk, credit risk, leverage risk and capital risk that are faced by the firm. Together these three levels of activities effectively create firm value.
Figure.1 Conceptual Framework of CG and ERM Joint Impact on Firm Value
A. In addition to these three specific hypotheses, this research also identifies key significant determinants that influence ERM and CG initiatives for enhancing firm value.
METHODOLOGY

Measuring ERM Initiatives
Since ERM function is rarely observed in financial firms, and empirical evidence on ERM metric is scarce, we proxy ERM metric in this study as an indicator variable with ERM=1 implying adoption of ERM initiatives by the financial firms who have met any one of the following five conditions, and ERM=0 implying non-adoption of ERM initiatives. This condition reflects pro-active action to manage credit risk.
Higher the reserve ratio lower are the credit risks in the financial firm.
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If the financial firm has Tier-1 Capital Ratio greater than 4%.
In this condition, positive tier-1 capital adequacy as per the stipulations from the GCC Central Banks, imply commitment of management to potentially employ risk management practices to mitigate capital risk of the firms.
Measuring Firm
Value-Tobin's Q Consistent with the general practice in the corporate finance literature we use Tobin's Q as a proxy for firm value (Boone et al (2007) , Linck et al. (2008) , and Lehn et al. (2009) ). Lang and Stulz (1994) explain that Tobin's Q dominates other performance measures (e.g., stock returns and accounting measures) because, unlike other measures, Tobin's Q does not require risk adjustment or normalization. Furthermore, because Tobin's Q reflects market expectations, it is relatively free from managerial manipulation (Lindenberg and Ross, 1981) . Cummins, Lewis, and Wei (2006) contend that Tobin's Q is appropriate for finance companies because the book value of their assets is a much closer approximation of replacement costs than would be the case for nonfinancial firms. We measure Tobin's Q as the market value of equity plus the book value of liabilities divided by the book value of assets.
Measuring CG
Good CG requires the board to constantly monitor the firm to ensure growth in the firm value to protect the interests of the shareholders. Yermack (1996) used factors such as board size and existence of audit committees to measure the impact on Tobin-Q. We measure CG as the number of members in the BOD. We test the simultaneity and endogeneity hypotheses through simultaneous equation system using 3SLS -Instrumental Variable (IV) Technique 4 . The instrument variables generally include all of the independent variables in the system of equations and may include any other variable as well. In this simultaneous equation system, the right-hand side regressors are allowed to be the endogenous variables as well. In one equation, ERM is allowed to depend on firm value, CG and other control variables while in other equations, CG is allowed to depend on firm value and other control variables. 3SLS-IV does not assume cross equation correlation of Page | 38 error terms and it uses a set of instrumental variables for estimation purposes. In the next section, the conceptual framework (figure 1) is evaluated by system equations modeling. The research hypotheses are empirically tested with a set of data of financial institutions in GCC which are fast emerging economies characterized by much activity in CG, and ERM during 2004 and thereafter.
Empirical Model
The conceptual framework (figure 1) is modelled through the simultaneous system of equations of the form: Yit = Xitβit + εit , i=1,…….m, Where: Yi represents Tx1 vector of equation i = equation number 1 to 3 Xi is a T×ki matrix of determinants in each of the three system equations βi is a ki×1 vector of system coefficient in each of the three system equations εi are T×1 vector of errors in each of the three system equations, and t = 1, …,T 5 .
Equation 1 -ERM Determinants & Hypotheses
The first equation ERMt in the system of equations is modeled as below: ERMt = a11 + b12 FVt + b13 CGt + b14 LLRt + b15 CARt + b16 ROAAt + b17 MBt + b18 DGt + b19 Sizet + b1,10 DEt + b1,11 Opaquet + b1, 12 CVNIt + b1, 13 Slackt + b1, 14 Diverset + ε1t
Firm value (FVt) and CGt are endogenous and discussed in equations 2 and 3. Other right hand side variables characterize risk features, financial features, asset features, market features and firm features and are discussed below.
Loan loss reserves (LLRt): represent credit risk. Higher loan reserves imply conservative behavior of the firm's management to overcome credit risk. Hence hypothesis of positive sign on the estimated coefficient is plausible.
Tier-1 Capital (CARt): represents capital risk. Higher tier-1 capital implies a conservative regulatory requirement to overcome capital risk. Hence hypothesis of positive sign on the estimated coefficient is plausible.
Profitability (ROAAt):
Profitability is measures as return on average asset. This determinant represents financial characteristics of the firms. The sign on this determinant is mixed. Positive sign implies firms have resources to implement ERM initiatives. Negative sign implies that adoption of ERM entailed significant capital expenditure resulting in reduced profitability.
Market-Book (MBt) ratio:
This determinant represents market characteristics of banks. A positive sign is expected on the estimated coefficient representing the fact that investors value favorably the firms adopting ERM as risk management strategy.
Duration Gap (DGt)
6
: A positive sign on this coefficient is expected signifying that the banks adopting duration gap measures represent actively participating in ERM activities. Sizet: Firm size is measured by the natural log of the book value of assets. Survey evidence suggests that larger firms are more likely to engage in ERM because they are more complex, face a wider array of risks, and have the institutional size to support the administrative cost of an ERM program (see, e.g., Colquitt, Hoyt, and Lee, 1999; Hoyt, Merkley, and Thiessen, 2001; Beasley, Clune, and Hermanson, 2005; Standard & Poor's, 2005) .
Leverage (DEt):
Leverage is measured as the ratio of liability to total equity (D:E). Firms engaging in ERM may have lower financial leverage if they have decided to lower their probability of financial distress by decreasing financial risk. However, firms may decide that as a result of ERM they are able to assume greater financial risk. Accordingly, Pagach and Warr (2010) posit that the relation between ERM adoption and leverage is unclear.
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Opaquet: Pottier and Sommer (2006) explain that relatively "opaque" firms are those that are harder for outsiders to evaluate. Liebenberg and Hoyt (2003) argue that firms that are relatively more opaque should derive greater benefit from ERM programs that communicate risk management objectives and strategies to outsiders. Pagach and Warr (2010) hypothesize that ERM adoption is related to the opacity of a firm's assets because assets that are relatively more opaque are more difficult to liquidate in order to avert financial distress. We measure opacity as the ratio of intangible assets to the book value of total assets & hypothesize a positive relation between opaque and ERM, due to the fact that more opaque firms have illiquid asset structure and thus are more prone to enterprise risk exposure.
CVNIt: is the coefficient of variation of net income (NI). This determinant represents risk characteristics. Firms that are relatively more volatile are likely to benefit from the effects of an ERM program. However, firms that have adopted ERM programs are likely to experience lower volatility of stock returns or earnings. Thus, the direction of the relation is ambiguous.
Slackt (Liquidity):
Slack implies financial liquidity and is measured as the ratio of cash and marketable securities to total assets. ERM firms may have higher levels of financial slack due to an emphasis of risk management on reducing the probability of financial distress. ERM users may also be able to reduce the level of financial slack because of improved risk management (Pagach and Warr (2010) ). Thus, the direction of the relation is ambiguous.
Diverset (Diversification):
Diversification in business is also likely to affect whether a firm adopts an ERM program or not. Theory suggests that diversification is associated with both costs and benefits. On the one hand, diversification may be performance enhancing due to the benefits associated with scope economies, larger internal capital markets, and risk reduction (Lewellen, 1971 , Teece, 1980 . On the other hand, diversification may reduce performance if it exacerbates agency costs and leads to inefficient crosssubsidization of poorly performing businesses (Easterbrook, 1984; Berger and Ofek, 1995) and thus increases potential for ERM. To control the effect of diversification on ERM, we use a dummy variable (DIVERSE) equal to 1 for firms that report diversified operations. We expect a mixed sign relation between diversification and ERM.
Equation 2 -Firm Value (FV or Tobin's Q) Determinants & Hypotheses
The second equation FVt in the system is modeled as below: FVt = a21 + b22 CGt + b23 ERMt + b24 Growtht + b25 ROAAt + b26 DIVPMTt + b27 DEt + b28 Sizet + b2,9 Efficiencyt + b2,10 MBt+ ε2t Governance (CGt): This is an endogenous variable in CG equation. Good governance requires the board to constantly monitor the firm to ensure growth in the firm value to protect the interests of the shareholders. We measure CG as the number of members in the BOD. A positive sign is expected between the firm value and CG. ERMt: ERM is an endogenous variable in the system. Growtht: Allayannis and Weston (2001) control for the effect of growth opportunities on Tobin's Q using the ratio of R&D expenditure to sales, or capital expenditure to assets. Due to the missing data for the majority of sample firms, historical yearly asset growth is used as a proxy for future growth opportunities. A positive relation is hypothesized between asset growth and Tobin's Q.
Profitability (ROAAt):
It is quite natural that profitable firms are likely to trade at a premium. To control for firm profitability, return on average assets (ROAA) is included in the model. ROAA is calculated as net income divided by average asset in t and t-1. We expect a positive relation between ROAA and Tobin's Q. Dividend payment (DIVPMTt) : Following Lang and Stulz (1994) , dividend payment indicator is included that equals 1 if the firm paid a dividend in the current year. On the one hand, investors may view a disbursement of cash in the form of a dividend as a sign that the firm has exhausted its growth opportunities. If this holds then the payment of dividends will negatively affect firm value. On the other hand, to the extent that dividends reduce free cash flow that could be used for managerial perquisite consumption, the payment of dividends is expected to positively affect firm value. Thus, the expected sign is ambiguous.
Leverage (DEt):
To control for the relation between capital structure and firm value we include a leverage variable that is equal to the ratio of the book value of liabilities to the market value of equity. On the one hand, financial leverage enhances firm value to the extent that it reduces free cash flow that might otherwise have Page | 40 been invested by managers with self-interest in suboptimal projects (Jensen, 1986) . On the other hand, excessive leverage can increase the probability of financial distress and cause the firm's owners to bear financial distress costs. Thus, the predicted sign on this variable is ambiguous.
Sizet:
It is important to control size in the analysis as ERM indicator which is endogenous may proxy for firm size. Large firms are more likely to have ERM programs in place (Liebenberg and Hoyt, 2003) . On the other hand, Lang and Stulz (1994) and Allayannis and Weston (2001) find a significant negative relation between size and firm value. We use natural log of assets to control for size-related variation in Tobin's Q. Thus, the predicted sign on this variable is ambiguous.
Efficiencyt: Earlier studies used a variety of cost efficiency measures as performance measures (He, Sommer and Xie (2011) ). We derive constant returns to scale cost efficiency scores from stochastic frontier efficiency modelling. The predicted sign on this variable is ambiguous. On the one hand, cost efficiency could enhance firm value which is plausible. On the other hand, excessive cost efficiency can decrease non-implementation of potential growth opportunities available to firms due to focus on cost efficiency. Thus, the predicted sign on this variable is ambiguous.
Market-Book (MBt) ratio:
This determinant represents market characteristics of financial institutions. A positive sign is expected on the estimated coefficient representing the fact that investor views the financial institutions with a favorable MB ratio as higher performing firm. This variable is measured as Market price of the firm's stock to Equity. A positive sign is hypothesized.
Equation 3 -Corporate Governance Determinants & Hypotheses
The third equation CGt in the system is modeled as below: CGt = a31 + b32 LISTt + b33 ACt + b34 Growtht + b35 FVt + b36 ERMt + b37 DIVERSEt + ε3t
Listing (LISTt): SOX Act identifies corporate governance best practices that are required to be followed by publicly listed companies. Hence a positive sign on the estimated coefficient is expected of the listed companies signifying good governance. LIST is an indicator variable equals 1 if the firm is listed in the local or regional financial market.
Audit Committee (ACt): Consistent with SOX Act, number of members in the audit committee in the BOD features active corporate governance. A positive sign on the estimated coefficient is thus expected between AC and Corporate Governance.
Growtht:
In terms of governance, active governance is concerned with stockholder value which requires firms to be growing concern at all times. Hence positive sign on the estimated coefficient is posited. Firm Value (FVt): is endogenous in the system of equations. Good governance requires the board to constantly monitor the firm to ensure consistent growth in the firm value to add value to the shareholders' wealth.
ERMt: This is also endogenous in the system.
DIVERSEt (Diversification):
Generally, the firm's BOD desires a diversified business to mitigate enterprise risk to shareholders. On the other hand, diversification may also reduce firm's performance due to higher capital costs for diversification. To control the effect of diversification on Corporate Governance, we use a dummy variable (DIVERSE) equal 1 for firms that report multiple activities in its operations. We expect a mixed relation between diversification and Corporate Governance. Finally, 2008-year dummy is included in all the three equations as a control for the crisis year in GCC in general and UAE in particular (UAE-2008) . Table 1 summarizes the definition of variables and aforesaid hypotheses. 
Preliminary Results
Summary statistics of the variables used in the study are reported in Table 2 . As generally expected, most of the variables are positively skewed and few are negatively skewed indicating non-normality of the set of determinants in the system of equations. Table 3 presents the correlation matrix of all the determinants in the system of equations. The general lack of high correlation between the independent variables suggests that Multicollinearity is not a problem in this study. Table 4 shows the distribution of financial institutions in the GCC used in this study. Out of 160 sample financial institutions in the GCC, 31% were in Bahrain followed by 22% in UAE, and 20% in Kuwait. 56% of financial institutions were commercial banks followed by 30% Islamic banks. 28% of the financial institutions were having diversified operations of which maximum diversification was seen in Kuwait (30%) followed by Bahrain (26%) and UAE (21%) with Qatar and Oman being least diversified internationally. 58% of the financial institutions were listed on respective country's stock exchange, of which Kuwait had maximum listed financial institutions (27%) followed by UAE (25%), and Bahrain (19%). Interestingly 75% of the financial institutions were being governed by BOD with Bahrain topping the list (30%), followed by Kuwait (20%), and UAE (19%). This indicates that all listed financial institutions in GCC do not necessarily have BOD (for example Kuwait and UAE) while few of non-listed FI were also governed by BOD (for example Bahrain, Oman and Qatar). International Review of Advances in Business, Management and Law IRAMBL, Vol 1., No. 3, ISSN: 2616-4272 Table 5 reports results of OLS (Model-1) 7 and 3SLS (Model-2) for GCC financial institutions in relation to UAE. Most of the coefficients were highly significant in 3SLS compared to single equation (Model-1). Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) 8 was generally lower in all three equations in Model-2 compared to Model 1, signifying gain in efficiency in joint estimation as conceptualized in the framework ( figure-1) . Also, the covariance of error terms is non-zero in 3SLS confirming that the system of equations is jointly interdependent. Thus our framework is plausible and first null hypothesis is validated. That is, it is not true that ERM &CG initiatives are not jointly undertaken by the firm, implying there is simultaneity in adopting these initiatives by the BOD. Therefore, the discussion is focused on 3SLS model results. 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
ERM Initiative
Relative to UAE, financial institutions in Bahrain, Oman and Qatar adopted ERM initiative less vigorously during the study period. This observation is statistically highly significant. During crisis period (2008) the ERM adoption in UAE decreased by around 0.16% and was statistically highly significant. Firm value did not significantly impact adoption of ERM initiative in GCC firms. However, active CG had a significant positive impact on adoption of ERM initiative in GCC firms.
As hypothesized, ERM function is positively related to loan loss reserves, Tier-1 Capital, market price to book ratio, leverage, variability in net income, slack (liquidity) and diversity of operations. Of these significant determinants, leverage, slackness (or liquidity), diversification and variability of earnings had higher magnitude of positive impact on ERM initiative.
A one percent increase in leverage triggered ERM adoption by 0.24%. This is consistent with the finding of Liebenberg and Hoyt (2003) that firms with greater financial leverage are more likely to adopt ERM.
A one percent increase in liquidity (slack) triggered ERM adoption by around 0.16%. This is consistent with the findings of Pagach and Warr (2010) who argue that ERM users may have higher levels of financial slack due to the emphasis on risk management for reducing the probability of financial distress.
Page | 46 may point to the fact that diversification may reduce performance as it exacerbates agency costs and leads to inefficient cross-subsidization of poorly performing businesses and thus increases potential for ERM initiative.
A one percent increase in variability in net income triggered ERM adoption by 0.015%. Firms that are relatively more volatile are likely to benefit from the effects of an ERM program.
The magnitude of positive impact of following determinants was less on ERM initiative although they were statistically significant.
A one percent increase in loan loss reserve ratio in gross loan triggered ERM adoption by 0.00042%. A higher loan reserve represents conservative behavior of financial institutions to overcome credit risk and hence this positive relation is plausible.
A one percent increase in tier-1 capital ratio triggered ERM adoption by 0.00026%. Higher tier-1 capital represents a conservative regulatory requirement to overcome capital risk. Hence hypothesis of positive sign on the estimated coefficient is plausible.
A one percent increase in market price to book ratio triggered ERM adoption by 0.0007%. This represents the fact that investors value favourably the financial institutions that adopt ERM as risk management strategy.
The degree of ERM adoption was higher due to the prevailing risk determinants such as leverage risk, liquidity risk, diversity of operations, and variability of net income, and to a lesser extent by default risk and capital risk in the financial institutions in GCC.
ERM function was significantly negatively related to opaqueness, size, and profitability of financial institutions in GCC. Unexpectedly the opaque variable showed negative relation implying that, relative to UAE other financial institutions in GCC with less intangible assets (less opaque) in their asset structure adopted ERM in their operations more vigorously compared to financial institutions with large intangible assets. A 1% reduction in opaqueness of financial institutions improved ERM adoption by 0.2818%. This finding is also in contrast to Pagach and Warr (2010) who stated that ERM adoption is related to the opacity of a firm's assets because assets that are relatively more opaque are more difficult to liquidate in order to avert financial distress.
The size variable also showed negative relation and were highly significant probably implying that small size GCC firms adopted ERM in their operations more vigorously compared to large size financial institutions. A 1% reduction in the size (in assets) of financial institutions improved ERM adoption by 0.12%. This finding is in contrast to the survey evidence that larger firms are more likely to engage in ERM because they are more complex, face a wider array of risks, and have the institutional size to support the administrative cost of an ERM program (Colquitt, Hoyt, and Lee, 1999; Hoyt, Merkley, and Thiessen, 2001; Beasley, Clune, and Hermanson, 2005; Standard & Poor's, 2005) . Similarly, a one percent increase in profitability of operations triggered reduction in ERM adoption by 0.0003%, implying that adoption of ERM entailed significant capital expenditure resulting in reduced profitability.
Firm Value (FV) Function
Equation 2 in Table 5 explains the firm value function of GCC financial institutions. Consistent with the framework (Figure 1 ), the ERM & CG initiative has a joint positive impact on firm value in GCC although they were statistically less significant.
Firm value also increased with the size of financial institutions. A one percent increase in the size of financial institutions increased the firm value by 0.988% and was statistically very significant. However, Lang and Stulz (1994) and Allayannis and Weston (2001) find a significantly negative relation between size and firm value in their studies.
Unexpectedly, firm value was negatively related to growth of GCC financial institutions. A one percent increase in growth rate of financial institutions reduced the firm value by 0.0135% and was highly significant. One can however argue that, increased growth rate might imply potential future growth opportunities in time t+1 for which the firm has to commit funds in time t, with the result there is reduced capital available in time t for firm's operations and hence firm value is reduced in time t.
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A one percent increase in dividend payout also decreased the firm value by 0.0035% and was statistically significant at 6% level. This is plausible since investors may view a disbursement of cash in the form of a dividend as a sign that GCC firms have exhausted their growth opportunities and hence the payment of dividends will negatively affect firm value.
Other determinants such as Profitability, Leverage, Cost efficiency of operations, Market price to book ratio and distress period in UAE (UAE-2008) were not significant determinants of firm value of GCC financial institutions.
Corporate Governance (CG) Initiative
Equation 3 in Table 5 explains the CG initiative in GCC financial institutions. The results suggest that corporate governance mechanism was active in financial institutions in Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Oman relative to UAE financial institutions. While the listing of financial institutions in GCC did not significantly impact governance of GCC financial institutions, the existence of audit committees shows a significant positive impact on the governance of GCC financial institutions. Economic crisis in UAE in 2008 did not impact CG initiative of GCC financial institutions.
Interestingly, ERM adoption in GCC financial institutions has shown a significant positive influence on governance mechanism in GCC. A one percent increase in ERM initiative impacted corporate governance of GCC financial institutions by 1.7239%. This is statistically highly significant. This result implies that GCC firms' BOD derived greater benefits from ERM adoption in their firms.
As expected, CG initiative was positively impacted by existence of audit committees in the BOD of GCC financial institutions. A 1% increase in existence of audit committees resulted in around 3.42% improvement in CG initiative. SOX Act identifies existence of audit committee in the BOD as a good feature of active governance.
To that extent the system model results indicate that consistent with SOX Act, GCC financial institutions exhibited active corporate governance.
The governance was however highly significantly and negatively related to diversity of operations of GCC financial institutions. A one percent increase in diversity of operations in GCC financial institutions outside the GCC borders reduced governance efficacy by around 1.78 percent. This is plausible since diversification may increase agency costs and lead to inefficient cross-subsidization of poorly performing businesses (Easterbrook, 1984; Berger and Ofek, 1995) , due to the prevailing economic uncertainty in neighboring Arab countries owing to Arab Spring. Other variables such as Growth, and Firm Value did not impact CG of GCC financial institutions.
In summary, the results in Table 5 and non-zero covariance of error terms across three equations rejects the null hypothesis that the Equations (1), (2) and 3 are independent and supports endogeneity of ERM, CG initiatives on firm values through their joint estimation. Thus, the second research null hypothesis is not true i.e., independence between firm value, CG and ERM initiatives is not true.
CONCLUSIONS AND LIMITATIONS
Conclusions
One of the major challenges facing researchers is how to identify firms that engage in ERM & CG that add value to the firms. The study designs a framework (figure 1) to model the simultaneity and jointness of Corporate Governance, ERM decisions on Firm Value, and to provide empirical evidence on the quantitative and joint impact of ERM & CG initiatives on firm value of financial institutions in GCC. In the absence of explicit disclosure of ERM implementation & CG initiatives, we use an indicator variable for a variety of "if" conditions for proxying ERM & CG. For ERM, the alternative condition is any one of the stated condition namely: if the financial firm has various committees (including audit committee) in the BOD (BOD); if the financial firm has derivative products under assets/liabilities; if the financial firm maintains a positive reserve ratio of non-performance loans to gross loans; if the financial firm has tier-1 Capital Adequacy Ratio greater than 4%. CG initiative is similarly modeled as an indicator variable if there is presence of audit committees in the BOD, existence of decisions on dividend payment by the BOD, and if the firms are publicly listed; all these conditions reflect components of active corporate governance mechanism. Tobin-Q measure proxies Firm value in GCC.
The hypotheses that there exists simultaneity and endogeneity in corporate governance (through CG and ERM initiatives) and firm value are tested through modelling a system of 3SLS equation system. The non-zero cross ERM was significantly dependent on: Risk Characteristics (measured by variance in net income or variance in market price per share); Financial characteristics (measured by Leverage, Cash availability (slack), Profitability); Asset characteristics (measured by opaque (intangible) assets in total assets, growth options), Market characteristics (measured by Market to Book ratio); and Firm risk characteristics (measured by Tier-1 Capital, Loan loss reserve, Market to book ratio). Firm value was dependent on: Growth, Dividend pay-out, and Size. Similarly, Corporate Governance (CG) was dependent on: ERM, Existence of Audit committee (in BOD), and diversity in operations. Of these significant determinants, higher magnitude of positive impact on ERM initiative was seen in leverage (0.24%), liquidity (0.16%), diversification (0.05%) and variability of earnings (0.015%). Loan loss reserves, tier-1 capital ratio and market to book price had statistically significant but very minor positive impact on ERM initiative. Unexpectedly, ERM initiative was significantly and negatively impacted by determinants such as less opaqueness (0.28%), size of the firm (0.12%) and profitability (0.0003%).
The system model results further indicate that firm value is jointly and positively impacted by ERM & CG initiatives on GCC financial institutions although the impact was less statistically significant. Firm value did not significantly improve during 2004-11 in GCC countries. However, firm size was the only determinant that significantly and positively impacted (0.988%) firm value. Other determinants such as growth (0.0135%) and dividend pay-out (0.0035%) had a significant negative impact on firm value in GCC.
Relative to UAE the corporate governance mechanism was active in Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Oman firms. Further, the existence of audit committees in the GCC firm's boards and ERM adoption showed significant positive impact on corporate governance by 3.42% and 1.7239% respectively in GCC. On the other hand, corporate governance mechanism was significantly less inclined to encourage diversity of firms' operations as the GCC boards were more apprehensive that their efficacy would decline by around 1.78 for every 1 % increase in diversity of operations outside GCC borders.
This study is possibly the first study to document the value relevance of ERM and CG initiatives on GCC firms' value. This research analysis provides a starting point for additional research into ERM, Governance and Firm value in neighbouring AGCC, MEA and other developing economies. The vast majority of extant research takes the form of surveys. These studies are valuable as a source of descriptive information regarding ERM & CG use but do not answer the fundamental question of whether ERM & CG enhances firm value, which is addressed in this study using a reasonably good methodology and data set that are readily available to most researchers.
Limitations
Relatively small sample size, small GCC economies, and inability to measure the intensity of ERM & CG usage in GCC firms are some of the limitations in our study. These limitations may reduce the extent to which the results may be generalized. As such, additional research using larger samples by extending to AGCC (Arab GCC) countries and more refined ERM & CG measures would represent an important broader generalizable contribution to the emerging literature on ERM, CG and firm value.
